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INTRODUCTION 
The field of transitional justice has expanded beyond dealing with 
accountability, truth, victims’ redress, and a number of related issues in 
the context of democratization processes.  It now addresses a much 
wider variety of cases where the international community, states, local 
communities, or other actors implement various measures to confront 
(sometimes still ongoing) human rights abuses and other forms of 
injustices.1  While early transitional justice scholarship focused 
primarily on the judicial and quasi-judicial processes launched to deal 
with massive human rights abuses following a fundamental political 
transition,2 scholars now increasingly seem to expect that transitional 
justice mechanisms will bring about transformation—political or 
otherwise.3  Yet, it is often unclear what purposes transitional justice 
                                                 
1. See, e.g., Christine Bell, Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinary and the State 
of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field’, 3 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 5 (2009) (discussing 
development in the field of transitional justice). 
2. See generally RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000).  
3. See, e.g., Fionnuala N. Aoláin & Colm Campbell, The Paradox of 
Transition in Conflicted Democracies, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 172 (2005) (arguing that 
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serves, how the use of these mechanisms impacts the prospects of 
transition, and which stakeholders promote or discourage the 
establishment of transitional justice processes.4  Using the Kenyan 
government’s reaction to the 2008 post-election violence as a case 
study, this article examines some important aspects of transitional 
justice in Kenya.  More specifically, the article identifies and discusses 
the drivers and obstacles to accountability for the post-election violence 
as well as the question of how the use of accountability measures may 
impact the prospects of a meaningful transition in the country.  
In Kenya, the process of establishing a political settlement to the 
disputed 2007 general elections was combined with efforts to create a 
number of mechanisms aimed at addressing the country’s legacy of 
political violence.5  Though these accountability, truth-seeking, and 
reform measures have generally been conceptualized within a 
transitional justice paradigm,6 arguably there has been no fundamental 
(political or otherwise) transition in the country, and it is disputed 
whether such a transition is likely to take place in the near future.7  
Little is known of how the absence of a fundamental political transition 
                                                 
justice tools used in contexts where there has not been a fundamental political 
transition should be conceptualized as transitional justice since they have potential 
to bring about a stable and peaceful democracy).     
4. See, e.g., Thomas Obel Hansen, Transitional Justice: Toward a Differentiated 
Theory, 13 OR. REV. INT’L L. 1 (2011) available at http://www.law.uoregon.edu/ 
org/oril/docs/13-1/Hansen.pdf (discussing various scenarios in which transitional 
justice mechanisms may be utilized, and the different interests these mechanisms can 
serve). 
5. Thomas Obel Hansen, Political Violence in Kenya: A Study of Causes, 
Responses, and a Framework for Discussing Preventive Action, INST. FOR SECURITY 
STUD. PAPER 205 (Nov. 2009) available at http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/ 
p205.pdf. 
6. Evelyne Asaala, Exploring Transitional Justice as a Vehicle for Social and 
Political Transformation in Kenya, 10 AFR. HUM. RTS. L. J. 377, 382 (2010) 
available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/publications/ahrlj/ahrlj_vol10 
_no2_2010.pdf.  See also Godfrey M. Musila, Options for Transitional Justice in 
Kenya: Autonomy and the Challenge of External Prescriptions, 3 INT’L J. 
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 445 (2009). 
7. See Osogo Ambani, Conditions are Hardly Right for Transitional Justice, 
DAILY NATION, Aug. 11, 2009, http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion//440808/ 
638224/-/4mmd2w/-/index.html (arguing that “Kenya is not experiencing a 
transition”).  But see Asaala, supra note 6, at 385 (concluding that “Kenya remains a 
state in transition”).  
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has affected the pursuit of transitional justice in Kenya.8  Furthermore, 
there has only been limited engagement with the question of how the 
various transitional justice measures in the country impact the political 
landscape and the possibility of a transition9 – here understood to 
concern political change as well as peaceful transformation.  
Focusing on accountability measures, this article sets out to explore 
these gaps in the literature.  First, this article analyzes how the absence 
of fundamental transition has impacted the pursuit of accountability for 
the 2008 post-election violence.  Second, this article explores how the 
accountability process impacts domestic politics and security.  
I.  BACKGROUND TO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN KENYA 
Contrary to mainstream perceptions, large-scale political violence 
in Kenya is not exclusively related to the disputed 2007 elections, but 
has unfolded on a number of other occasions,10 particularly in the 
context of elections.  Since the establishment of a multi-party system 
in 1992, elections in Kenya have tended to be surrounded by clashes 
between the supporters of different political parties, sometimes at a 
level comparable to the 2008 violence.  In 1992, for example, Human 
Rights Watch estimates that electoral violence claimed the lives of 
approximately 1,500 people and displaced approximately 300,000.11  
Five years later, the 1997 elections were similarly followed by large-
scale violence, especially in the Coast Province and in the Rift 
                                                 
8. But see Musila, supra note 6 (discussing how various stakeholders approach 
the transitional justice debate in Kenya). 
9. But see Christine Alai & Njonjo Mue, Briefing Paper, Kenya: Impact of the 
Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court, INT’L CENTER FOR 
TRANSITIONAL JUST. (2010) [hereinafter Impact of the Rome Statute], available at 
http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Kenya-ICC-Impact-2010-English.pdf; Thomas 
Obel Hansen, How Will International Criminal Court Prosecutions Impact Kenya’s 
Legacy of Political Violence?, TOWARD FREEDOM, AFRICA (Apr. 12, 2011, 11:23 
PM), http://www.towardfreedom.com/africa/2359-how-will-international-criminal-
court-prosecutions-impact-on-kenyas-legacy-of-political-violence.  
10. Madeline Bunting, Comment, The Violence in Kenya May be Awful, But it 
is Not Senseless ‘Savagery,’ GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
commentisfree/2008/jan/14/kenya.world. 
11. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PLAYING WITH FIRE: WEAPONS 
PROLIFERATION, POLITICAL VIOLENCE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN KENYA 20 (2002), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2002/kenya/Kenya0502.pdf. 
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Valley.12  Though far more peaceful than the two previous elections, 
some violent incidents also took place in connection with the 2002 
elections.13  
In 2007, the trend of violence persisted.  Following a disputed 
presidential election in December 2007, where both incumbent 
president Mwai Kibaki (PNU political party) and his challenger Raila 
Odinga (ODM political party) claimed victory, large-scale violence 
erupted in various parts of Kenya, in particular the Rift Valley and 
Nairobi slums.14  During the course of a few weeks, more than a 
thousand Kenyans died in clashes between supporters of Kibaki and 
Odinga.15  The violence was driven by armed youth groups and the 
Mungiki criminal gang, but the police were also involved in the 
attacks, responsible for perhaps approximately one-third of the total 
casualties.16  
Under the auspices of the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, 
headed by former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, an 
internationally-sponsored mediation process known as the “Kenyan 
National Dialogue and Reconciliation” (KNDR) enabled a settlement 
to the dispute.17  This entailed the creation of a coalition government 
in which Kibaki remained president and Odinga became prime 
                                                 
12. Id. at 21. 
13. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BALLOTS TO BULLETS: ORGANIZED 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND KENYA’S CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 6 (2008) [hereinafter 
BALLOTS TO BULLETS], available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/ 
reports/kenya0308web.pdf.  
14. See generally COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE POST ELECTION 
VIOLENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO POST ELECTION 
VIOLENCE, (2008) [hereinafter CIPEV], available at http://www.dialoguekenya.org/ 
docs/PEV%20Report.pdf; BALLOTS TO BULLETS, supra note 13; Hansen, Political 
Violence in Kenya: A Study of Causes, Responses, and a Framework for Discussing 
Preventive Action, supra note 5. 
15. CIPEV, supra note 14, at 305. 
16. Id. at 384-85. 
17. See KENYAN NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION, THE NATIONAL 
ACCORD AND RECONCILIATION ACT (2008), available at 
http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/Signed_National_Accord_Act_Feb28.pdf; 
Interview by Martin Griffiths with Kofi A. Annan, 7th Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, in Geneva, Switz. (May 9, 2008) [hereinafter Kofi A. Annan 
Interview], available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2008.nsf/FilesByRWD 
ocUnidFilename/JBRN-7QMD4C-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf (discussing 
the process of negotiating this settlement). 
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minister.18  Under pressure from the international community and 
Kenyan civil society, the two parties to the dispute publically stated 
their commitment to establishing a number of mechanisms aimed at 
addressing Kenya’s legacy of political violence, including criminal 
prosecutions; a Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission 
(TJRC); a constitutional review process; and other measures.19 
While debates about transitional justice have taken place on a 
number of occasions in Kenya’s history,20 the current discussions 
about accountability, truth-seeking, and a number of related issues 
tend to be specifically linked to the violence in 2008.21  Nonetheless, 
some of the measures established, including the TJRC, are intended to 
address political violence and other injustices in a comprehensive 
manner, covering the entire post-colonial period.22  As argued in this 
                                                 
18. Kofi A. Annan Interview, supra note 17.   
19. See KENYAN NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION, ANNOTATED 
AGENDA AND TIMETABLE (Feb. 1, 2008) [hereinafter KNDR ANNOTATED AGENDA], 
available at http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/Signed_Annotated_Agenda_ 
Feb1st.pdf; KENYAN NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION, STATEMENT OF 
PRINCIPLES ON LONG-TERM ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS (May 23, 2008), available at 
http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/S_of_P_with_Matrix.pdf.  Kenyan NATIONAL 
DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION, AGENDA ITEM 3: HOW TO SOLVE THE POLITICAL 
CRISIS (Feb. 14, 2008) [hereinafter KNDR AGENDA ITEM], available at 
http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/14_Feb_08_TsavoAgreement.pdf.  For an 
analysis of the debate and establishment of these various processes, see Hansen, 
Political Violence in Kenya: A Study of Causes, Responses, and a Framework for 
Discussing Preventive Action, supra note 5. 
20. See, e.g., Wanza Kioko, The Place of Transitional Justice in Kenya’s 
Impending Political Transition, in BUILDING AN OPEN SOCIETY: THE POLITICS OF 
TRANSITION IN KENYA 306 (Lawrence M. Mute, Kichamu Akivaga & Wanza Kioko 
eds., 2002). 
21. Musila, supra note 6. 
22. For an account of the TJRC, see Asaala, supra note 6, at 395-404.  In 
addition to electoral violence, the various post-independence governments have, to 
different extents, been responsible for gross human rights violations.  Under Jomo 
Kenyatta (1963-1978) and Daniel Moi’s (1978-2002) regimes, political opponents 
and other critics of the incumbent frequently suffered arbitrary detention, torture, 
and in some cases, extrajudicial killings.  See Susanne D. Mueller, The Political 
Economy of Kenya’s Crisis, 2 J. E. AFR. STUD. 185.  Although the human rights 
record of the current coalition government has significantly improved—especially 
compared to Moi’s dictatorship—extrajudicial killings by police continue to occur, 
especially in the context of organized crime.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DIVIDE AND 
RULE STATE-SPONSORED ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN KENYA 6-10 (1993), available at 
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article, other measures, such as the accountability process, may also 
address some of the factors that have allowed political violence to 
unfold in the country on a regular basis.   
II.  SHAPING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE SOLUTIONS: POLITICAL 
OBSTACLES TO ACCOUNTABILITY FOR KENYA’S  
POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE  
A. The Initial Debate Concerning a Local or International 
Accountability Process 
From its inception, the debate about accountability for the 2008 
election violence has been framed around a perceived dichotomy 
between local and international forums for justice.  However, as this 
article suggests, rather than taking the form of a principled discussion 
about the most appropriate forum for a legitimate accountability 
process, members of Kenya’s political elite have tended to support 
different forums for an accountability process based on other 
considerations, including the prospects of compromising justice or 
gaining personal advantage by seeing political opponents targeted.   
The debate over local or international justice was triggered by the 
publication of a report by the Commission of Inquiry into Post-
Election Violence (CIPEV), which the parties to the election dispute 
created to investigate the violence and make recommendations on how 
to address it.23  In the October 2008 publication, CIPEV recommended 
the establishment of a local accountability process (a so-called Special 
Tribunal) composed of Kenyans and foreigners to prosecute those 
responsible for organizing the 2008 post-election violence.24  CIPEV 
made the proposal under the threat that, if the government failed to 
immediately comply with the recommendations, it would forward “a 
list containing names of and relevant information on those suspected 
                                                 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1993/kenya1193.pdf.  See also U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Promotion and 
Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Including the Right to Development: Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston, On His Mission to 
Kenya, ¶ 5, 8, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/11/2/Add.6 (May 26, 2009). 
23. See CIPEV, supra note 14. 
24. Id. at 472–75. 
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to bear the greatest responsibility for crimes falling within the 
jurisdiction of the proposed Special Tribunal” to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor.25  
Before the CIPEV report went public, the parties to the KNDR 
had already stated their commitment to criminal prosecutions of those 
responsible for the post-election violence.26  However, it soon became 
clear that it would be difficult to obtain the necessary political 
commitment for establishing local accountability measures.  On 
February 12, 2009, for example, the Kenyan parliament voted down a 
bill concerning the establishment of a special tribunal to deal with the 
post-election violence.27  
Many of the members of parliament who opposed this opportunity 
to establish a local accountability process cited problems with judicial 
independence in Kenya and emphasized their preference to conduct 
the trials in The Hague.  For example, following the defeat of the 
February bill, William Ruto argued, “Kofi Annan should hand over 
the envelope that contains names of suspects to the International 
Criminal Court at The Hague so that proper investigations can start.”28  
This response might seem ironic because Ruto was later named as one 
of the ICC suspects, in connection to which he unsurprisingly became 
                                                 
25. CIPEV required the coalition partners to make and sign an agreement to 
establish a special tribunal within sixty days after presenting the report to the Panel 
of Eminent African Personalities. See id. at 473.  As Musila points out, this 
provision in the report seems to be based on a misunderstanding about the 
circumstances under which the ICC’s jurisdiction is triggered.  Musila, supra note 6, 
at 457. 
26. See KNDR ANNOTATED AGENDA, supra note 19, at 1 (explaining that the 
parties agreed to conduct further discussions on how to ensure “the impartial, 
effective and expeditious investigation of gross and systematic violations of human 
rights and that those found guilty are brought to justice”); KNDR AGENDA ITEM, 
supra note 19, § III   (indicating that the parties recognized the need for a political 
settlement to promote national reconciliation and unity, which in turn requires 
“identification and prosecution of perpetrators of violence”). 
27. Further, on July 14, 2009, the cabinet rejected a bill on special tribunals; 
on July 30, 2009, parliament rejected a special tribunal bill; and on November 14, 
2009, there was no quorum for debating the special tribunal bill.  See KENYA 
NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION MONITORING PROJECT, DRAFT REVIEW 
REPORT 23 (Apr. 2011), [hereinafter KNDR DRAFT REVIEW], available at 
http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/ April2011KNDRReport.pdf. 
28. See Ruto: Why I Prefer The Hague Route, DAILY NATION (Feb. 21, 2009), 
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/533390/-/u2h24m/-/index.html. 
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strongly opposed to The Hague option.29  On the other hand, Odinga, 
who was initially in favor of the local option, became a strong 
supporter for ICC trials once the suspects—some of whom are in 
political opposition to Odinga—were named.30  The fact that Ruto, 
Odinga, and many others have continuously reversed their stance on 
where to conduct trials illustrates, as Musila notes, how “[p]olitical 
elites, in particular those reported to be on the list of accused prepared 
by the Waki Commission, have vacillated between the various 
options, unsure which would safeguard their own agendas: trials in 
The Hague or local trials; trials before the Special Tribunal or national 
courts; and/or the TJRC.”31 
B.  Political Elites’ Reactions to the Naming of ICC Suspects 
In July 2009, Kofi Annan, who had been provided with a list of 
key suspects in the election violence by CIPEV, lost his patience with 
the Kenyan leadership and forwarded the list to the ICC Prosecutor.32  
On March 31, 2010, amidst continued debate in Kenya about 
establishing a special tribunal, using the ordinary court system to 
prosecute the masterminds of the post-election violence, or relying on 
the TJRC,33 Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC authorized the 
Prosecutor to commence an investigation into the Kenyan case.34 
                                                 
29. See Benjamin Muindi, ICC: Uhuru, Ruto Lash Out at PM, DAILY NATION 
(Mar. 26, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/1133610/-/7q7klt/-
/index.html.  At one point (August 2009), Ruto seemed to favour using the TJRC to 
deal with the organizers and perpetrators of Kenya’s post-election violence.  See 
Maureen Mudi and Karanja Njoroge, Ruto Urges Clergy to Back Reconciliation,  
STANDARD (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/archives/sports/ 
InsidePage.php?id=1144020630&cid=4. 
30. See Ruto: Why I Prefer the Hague Route, supra note 28. 
31. See Musila, supra note 6, at 450.  The Waki Commission is the unofficial 
name for CIPEV. 
32. See Hansen, Political Violence in Kenya: A Study of Causes, Responses, 
and a Framework for Discussing Preventive Action, supra note 5, at 9. 
33. See Impact of the Rome Statute, supra note 9, at 2-3 (discussing the 
various attempts of establishing a local accountability mechanism). 
34. See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09-19, Decision 
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation 
into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 83 (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc854287.pdf. 
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On December 15, 2010, less than a year after the Pre-Trial 
Chamber granted the prosecutor permission to open an investigation 
into Kenya’s post-election violence, Ocampo submitted applications 
requesting the Court to summon the six individuals he deemed to bear 
the greatest responsibility for the violence.  Among the suspects are 
Francis Muthaura, the top civil servant in the country, as well as Ruto 
and Uhuru Kenyatta, who have both announced their candidacy for 
the 2012 presidential elections.35 
Though most Kenyan leaders, including President Kibaki, have 
continuously stated their commitment to cooperate with the ICC,36 the 
government’s actual level of cooperation has often been half-
hearted.37  Indeed, after Ocampo named the suspects in December 
2010, Kenyan leaders have made a series of moves aimed at halting 
the ICC process.   
i.  Motion Requiring Withdrawal from the Rome Statute 
On December 22, 2010, almost immediately following Ocampo’s 
request to have the summonses issued, the Kenyan parliament passed 
a motion requiring the Kenyan government to take “appropriate action 
                                                 
35. See Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to William Samoei 
Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Public Redacted Version of 
Document ICC-01/09-30-Conf-Exp, Dec. 15, 2010, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/ 
doc/doc1050835.pdf [hereinafter Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as 
to Ruto, Kosgey and Sang]; Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to 
Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, 
Public Redacted Version of Document ICC-01/09-31-Conf-Exp, Dec. 15, 2010, 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1050845.pdf [hereinafter Prosecutor’s 
Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali].  
36. See Impact of the Rome Statute, supra note 9, at 3-4; KNDR DRAFT 
REVIEW, supra note 27, at 23-24.  For a recent statement confirming the 
government’s commitment to the ICC process, see OFFICE OF PUBLIC 
COMMUNICATIONS (OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT SPOKESPERSON), GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSE TO MEDIA STATEMENT BY ICC PROSECUTOR LUIS MORENO OCAMPO 
(2011), http://www.communication.go.ke/media.asp?id=1278 (noting “[t]he 
government wishes to inform the world that we understand, appreciate and respect 
the Rome Statute, the Rights enshrined by the United Nations and the ICC 
process.”). 
37. See, e.g., KNDR DRAFT REVIEW, supra note 27, at 23-24. 
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to withdraw from the Rome Statute.”38  The motion, which was 
opposed by only one member of parliament (former Justice Minister 
and presidential candidate for the 2012 elections, Martha Karua), was 
passed under threat that any failure to comply with its contents within 
sixty days would lead to actions against the Kibaki administration, 
including sabotaging government business in the Parliament.39  Noting 
that “any criminal investigations or prosecutions arising out of the 
post election violence of 2007/2008 be undertaken under the 
framework of the new Constitution,” the motion not only rejected ICC 
intervention, but once again brought attention back to the possibility 
of establishing a local accountability process.40 
Although some cabinet members initially appeared in favor of the 
motion, the government ultimately chose not to take any action on it.41  
Rather than reflecting the government’s commitment to the ICC 
process, this neglect of parliament’s decision seems to be based on 
(the correct) understanding that a possible withdrawal from the Rome 
Statute would not affect the country’s obligation to cooperate with the 
ICC concerning the two pending cases.42  This interpretation is 
                                                 
38. Motion 144 in KENYA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, Motions 2010 (Dec. 22, 
2010), available at http://www.parliament.go.ke/index.php?option=com_docman& 
task=doc_download&gid=636&Itemid=. 
39. See id. (implying that action will be taken against the government if it fails 
to comply); Amnesty Int’l, Kenya: Denouncing the Rome Statute Shall Not Have 
Any Effect on Investigations Currently Under Course, AI Index AFR 32/019/2010 
(Dec. 23, 2010), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR32/019/ 
2010/en/bdeb0dac-6e55-4496-b4ad-f67201c5caf8/afr320192010en.pdf.  
40. See Motion 144 in KENYA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, supra note 38. 
41. See, e.g., Thomas Obel Hansen, Why the Ocampo Six Should Not Become 
Kenya’s Six, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.opendemocracy.net/ 
thomas-obel-hansen/why-ocampo-six-should-not-become-kenya%E2%80%99s-six 
(noting that Energy Minister Kiraitu Murungi, Minister for Public Health and 
Sanitation Beth Mugo, and Minister for Nairobi Metropolitan Development Njeru 
Githae called for a withdrawal in early January 2011). 
42. According to Article 127(1) of the Rome Statute, a withdrawal takes effect 
“one year after the date of receipt of the notification, unless the notification specifies 
a later date.”  Article 127(2) further stipulates that,  
[a] State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the 
obligations arising from this Statute while it was a Party to the Statute, 
including any financial obligations which may have accrued.  Its 
withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with the Court in connection 
with criminal investigations and proceedings in relation to which the 
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supported by the fact that the government instead launched a number 
of other initiatives to end ICC involvement in Kenya. 
ii.  Efforts to Obtain a Deferral 
One such way of challenging the ICC process concerns the 
government’s efforts to obtain a U.N. Security Council deferral of the 
Kenyan cases under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, according to 
which the Council can order a temporary—but possibly renewed—
stop to ICC investigations or prosecutions if it deems that such action 
threatens international peace and security.43 
Spearheaded by Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka, in early 2011, 
the Kenyan government launched diplomatic efforts aimed at 
convincing other countries that the Security Council should defer the 
case.44  As an initial outcome of this diplomacy, in late January 2011, 
the African Union decided to support Kenya’s quest for putting a 
temporary stop to the ICC cases.45  Though this support from the 
African Union should be understood in light of how the regional body 
increasingly views ICC involvement on the continent as a threat to the 
sovereignty of African states, it also reveals that the Kenyan 
government used considerable resources to foster and mobilize 
support from other countries to halt the accountability process.46 
                                                 
withdrawing State had a duty to cooperate and which were commenced 
prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective, nor shall it 
prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter which was 
already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which the 
withdrawal became effective. 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
43. Article 16 of the Rome Statute states: “No investigation or prosecution 
may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months 
after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be 
renewed by the Council under the same conditions.” Id. 
44. See, e.g., Njeri Rugene, Kalonzo Defends Shuttle Over ICC Trials, DAILY 
NATION (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/1103784/-
/7ocyvn/-/index.html.  
45. See Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Implementation of 
the Decisions on the International Criminal Court Doc. EX.CL/639(XVIII), A.U. 
Doc. Assembly/AU/16 ¶ 6 (Jan. 30-31, 2011).  
46. See, e.g., Kalonzo’s Trips Cost Taxpayers Sh4 Million, KENTV, available 
at http://www.kentv.net/home/kentv-news/1-latest-news/3272-kalonzos-trips-cost-
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Having obtained this regional support, on February 8, 2011, the 
Kenyan government made a formal request to the U.N. Security 
Council for a deferral.47  In support of the request, government 
officials stated that because “some of the individuals mentioned by the 
ICC prosecutor are among the front runner presidential candidates and 
the civil servants mentioned are in office and charged with 
responsibilities for peace and security,” the ICC process poses “a real 
and present danger to the exercise of government and the management 
of peace and security in the country.”48 
As it became increasingly clear that it would prove difficult to 
convince U.N. Security Council members that the ICC process poses a 
threat to the country’s security and should therefore be deferred, the 
government instead deployed another strategy aimed at ending ICC 
action in the country.49   
iii.  Application Challenging Admissibility 
On March 31, 2011, two British lawyers (Sir Geoffrey Nice and 
Rodney Dixon) hired by the Kenyan government filed an application 
with the ICC challenging the admissibility of the cases pursuant to 
Article 19 of the Rome Statute, which states (with reference to Article 
17 of the Statute) that the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction if a state 
                                                 
taxpayer-sh4-million (noting that the Vice President spent around 4 million Kenyan 
shillings visiting heads of states and ministers in Nigeria, Libya, Malawi, Ethiopia, 
South Africa, and Uganda lobbying for support for the deferral). 
47. See, e.g., Kenya Petitions UN Organ to Delay Trials, DAILY NATION (Feb. 
10, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Kenya%20petitions%20UN% 
20organ%20to%20delay%20trials%20/-/1064/1105328/-/dtt3w0z/-/index.html. 
48. See Letter from Macharia Kamau, Kenya’s Permanent Representative to 
the U.N. in New York, to the President of the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome 
Statute (Feb. 28, 2011), [hereinafter Kamau Letter], available at 
http://news2.onlinenigeria.com/news/general/81922-Kenyas-letter-ICC-President. 
html. 
49. See, e.g., Kevin Kelley, Kenya ICC Deferral Bid Fails, DAILY NATION  
(Apr. 9, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/UN+Council+rejects+ 
Kenya+ICC+deferral+bid/-/1064/1141408/-/qmart0z/-/index.html (describing that 
on April 8, 2011 (after the US, the UK, and other permanent members of the 
Council had continuously stated their opposition to a deferral), the President of the 
U.N. Security Council declared that, “after full consideration,” the members of 
Council could not agree to support Kenya’s request for deferral and no further action 
would be taken on the matter for the time being).  
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with jurisdiction is investigating or prosecuting the case.50  The 
admissibility challenge points to “the fundamental and far-reaching 
constitutional and judicial reforms very recently enacted in Kenya.”51  
Based on these reforms, it is argued that the “[n]ational courts will 
now be capable of trying crimes from the post-election violence, 
including the ICC cases, without the need for legislation to create a 
special tribunal, thus overcoming a hurdle previously a major 
stumbling block.”52 
Despite the government’s attempts to convince the ICC judges 
that domestic investigations had commenced or were under way,53 on 
May 30, 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber II rejected the admissibility 
challenge, stating that no credible information had been provided to 
show that Kenya was in fact investigating the Ocampo Six.54  
Dissatisfied with this ruling, the government filed an appeal, which 
                                                 
50. See Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey, Joshua 
Arap Sang and Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and 
Mohammed Hussein Ali, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11 and ICC-01/09-02/11, 
Application on Behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya Pursuant to 
Article 19 of the ICC Statute (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1050005.pdf. 
51. Id. ¶ 2. 
52. Id. 
53. See, e.g., Bernard Namunane, Wako Orders Police to Probe the Ocampo 
Six, DAILY NATION (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/ 
Wako+orders+police+to+probe+the+Ocampo+Six+/-/1064/1151428/-/jkl0ym/-
/index.html (discussing that Attorney-General Amos Wako, seemingly in an attempt 
to promote the admissibility challenge, ordered the police commissioner to include 
the Ocampo Six in investigations of the post-election violence alleged to take place 
in Kenya). 
54. See Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and 
Joshua Arap Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Application by the 
Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 
19(2)(b) of the Statute (May 30, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/ 
doc/doc1078822.pdf; Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai 
Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the 
Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case 
Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute (May 30, 2011), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1078823.pdf.  
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the ICC Appeals Chamber subsequently rejected as it found there 
were no ongoing investigations in Kenya.55  
C.  Understanding the Government’s Accountability Policies 
When analyzed in conjunction, it seems clear that the main 
purpose of government’s action has been to avoid criminal 
prosecutions of the six suspects (and other masterminds of the post-
election violence) altogether.  On the one hand, the government has 
sought a deferral of the ICC cases, claiming that prosecuting the 
Ocampo Six will jeopardize peace and stability in the country.  But, 
on the other hand, the government has attempted to challenge the 
admissibility of the ICC cases, arguing that a domestic accountability 
process involving the six ICC suspects has commenced.  Various 
statements made by government officials support this interpretation.  
For example, Vice President Musyoka has noted, “[y]ou [Ruto and 
Kenyatta] should not lose hope because of being named in the ICC 
list.  The Government will do its best to assist you, because we want 
to ensure that every Kenyan feels part and parcel of the next 
dispensation.”56 
The leadership’s reluctance to ensure accountability for the post-
election violence, which stands in stark contrast to ordinary Kenyans’ 
support for ICC involvement in Kenya,57 may not be surprising given 
that some of the Ocampo Six are still involved at the highest levels of 
government business.  For example, despite being named as ICC 
suspects, Kenyatta continues to serve as Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of Finance, and Muthaura continues to serve as the top Civil 
                                                 
55. Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua 
Arap Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Application by the 
Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 
19(2)(b) of the Statute (May 30, 2011), supra note 54; Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Case No. ICC-
01/09-02/11, Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging 
the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute (May 30, 
2011), supra note 54. 
56. Raila Rivals Toy with Single Candidate Plan, DAILY NATION (Jan. 16, 
2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Raila+rivals+toy+with+single+ 
candidate+plan++/-/1064/1090904/-/13rakrr/-/index.html.  
57. See KNDR DRAFT REVIEW, supra note 27, at 9 (finding that 78% of 
Kenyans are “very/somewhat happy” about ICC involvement in Kenya).   
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Servant and Secretary to the Cabinet.  Consequently, as noted by the 
ICC prosecutor, “currently the suspects or their allies are able to 
influence the Kenyan government’s position.”58 
Thus, while Kenyan leaders initiated discussions about 
accountability, the absence of a political transition in Kenya has 
proved an obstacle to obtaining sufficient support for establishing 
accountability measures at the domestic level.  This political context 
has also caused crucial elements in the leadership to fiercely resist the 
ICC process, which is nonetheless still ongoing.  Yet, as discussed in 
the following section, government action to combat the ICC is not 
based on consensus in the Kenyan leadership. This lack of consensus 
has to do with a complex relationship between the accountability 
process and domestic politics. 
III.  THE ACCOUNTABILITY PROCESS’S IMPACT ON  
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND SECURITY  
Perhaps more than any other country where the ICC is involved, 
Kenya’s political landscape has been deeply influenced by the Court’s 
action.  Especially following Ocampo’s naming of the six suspects in 
December 2010, the ICC process has contributed to a number of 
significant developments in the political landscape, some of which 
have implications for peace and security in the country.  
A.  Split in the Coalition Government and ODM Political Party 
Since early 2011, tensions between the two coalition partners have 
escalated, something which on the surface seems a consequence of 
conflicting perceptions concerning whether the ICC process should be 
supported.  Whereas Kibaki’s PNU party, which has dominated the 
official government responses, is opposed to the proceedings, decisive 
                                                 
58. Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua 
Arap Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Prosecution’s Response to “Request for 
Assistance on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya pursuant to 
Article 93(10) and Rule 194” ¶ 8 (May 10, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc1070344.pdf. 
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parts of the ODM political party, including Prime Minister Odinga, 
support ICC trials.59   
The lack of a coherent government policy is evident from a 
number of incidents.  On March 13, 2011, for example, ODM 
Secretary General Anyang’ Nyong’o wrote a letter on behalf of the 
ODM political party, urging the U.N. Security Council not to order a 
deferral of the ICC cases, thereby distancing himself from the 
diplomacy launched by Vice President Musyoka.60  Further, in sharp 
contrast to the efforts made by the government to end ICC 
involvement, Odinga has expressed his support for trying the Ocampo 
Six in The Hague on a number of occasions.61  
However, though it is fair to conclude that the ICC issue has been 
the dominating controversy between the coalition partners since 
Ocampo named the six suspects in December 2010, it is important to 
note that the coalition government has a track record of failing to 
agree on other major national issues.62  Even if the ICC controversy 
has intensified tensions between the two coalition partners, it should 
therefore not be viewed as something which has caused a breakdown 
of an otherwise harmonious government.63 
                                                 
59. See, e.g., Dave Opiyo, Kenya Coalition Partners Lock Horns Over Cases, 
DAILY NATION (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Coalition 
+partners+lock+horns+over+cases+/-/1064/1122832/-/970bg9/-/index.html.  
60. See Peter Leftie, Reject Kenya Plea, Orange Asks UN, DAILY NATION 
(Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Orange+asks+UN+to 
+reject+ Kenya+plea+/-/1064/1124530/-/v7vewrz/-/index.html.    
61. See, e.g., Njeri Rugene, Prove your Innocence at Hague, Ocampo Six 
Told, DAILY NATION (Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/ 
PM+says+local+trials+require+independent+bodies/-/1064/1131542/-/aryd4lz/-
/index.html (quoting Prime Minister Odinga as saying, “[t]hat innocence of the six 
must be proved through a fair judicial process.  If you are mentioned, go through the 
process,” and “[i]f you are a suspect do not tell us you are innocent.  Go and clear 
your name there (at the Hague)”).    
62. Kenya: Who is in Charge Here, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, May 1, 2009, at 10. 
63. This conclusion is also supported by ordinary Kenyans.  A recent survey 
finds that only nine percent of Kenyans who believe it is hard for the coalition 
partners to work together view the ICC process as the major reason for this (while 
48% mention “lack of cohesion in the government,” 32% mention “political party 
divisions,” and 11% mention “2012 elections competition”).  See KNDR DRAFT 
REVIEW, supra note 27, at 45.  
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While there is a split between the coalition partners, there are also 
internal tensions within the ODM political party.  Such internal 
tensions were demonstrated in mid-March 2011, when a number of 
ODM leaders—including Vice Chair Aden Bare Duale, Deputy 
Organizing Secretary Benjamin Langat, and Deputy Secretary General 
Mohamed Mohamud—sent a letter to the U.N. Security Council, 
explaining that the letter sent by ODM Secretary General Nyong’o did 
not reflect the ODM party’s position on the deferral issue.64  Adding 
further confusion to the ODM policy, in late March 2011, both 
Nyong’o and Odinga seemed to temporarily change their position 
when they stated their support for the establishment of a credible local 
accountability process.65  Odinga, however, soon reaffirmed his 
support for trials in The Hague.66   
Furthermore, there was clear disagreement in the party when it 
discussed whether the party should provide the ODM suspects with 
legal assistance.  On March 24, 2011, Parliamentary Secretary Ababu 
Namwamba and other ODM leaders stated that all three suspects in 
the ODM case would be accompanied by lawyers paid by the party 
during their initial appearances in The Hague.67  However, Nyong’o 
later contradicted this statement when he denied claims that the party 
would provide legal aid to any of the ODM suspects.68  The confusion 
was complete when Ruto subsequently made clear that he was not 
even interested in obtaining such assistance, noting that it would 
resemble “a hyena promising defence to goats.”69  These tensions 
                                                 
64. See Ruto Allies Write to UN Council on Hague Trials, DAILY NATION 
(Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Ruto+allies+write+to+UN 
+council+on+Hague+trials+/-/1064/1127568/-/9yrarqz/-/index.html. 
65. See Patrick Mayoyo, ODM Pushes for ICC-Led Local Trials, DAILY 
NATION (Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/ODM+pushes+for 
+ICC+led+local+trials+/-/1064/1131848/-/1282c0j/-/index.html.   
66. See Dave Opiyo, Clear the Air on Trials, ODM Told, DAILY NATION (Mar. 
25, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/1132864/-/7q6x04/-
/index.html.    
67. See John Ngirachu & Njeri Rugene, ODM to Hire Lawyers for Ruto, 
Kosgey Over ICC Cases, DAILY NATION (Mar. 24, 2011), 
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/1132406/-/7q6tp1/-/index.html. 
68. See Njeri Rugene, ODM Confusion Over Legal Aid for ICC Suspects, 
DAILY NATION (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Confusion+ 
over+lawyers+hiring//1064/1132746/-/rn3ksuz/-/index.html. 
69. See Muindi, supra note 29. 
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between the coalition partners and within the ODM party are closely 
related to succession politics.   
The two front figures of the ODM party, Odinga and Ruto, as well 
as Kenyatta, have all announced their candidacy for the 2012 
presidential election.  Ruto, Kenyatta, and their supporters claim that 
Prime Minister Odinga is using the ICC process to get rid of his 
competitors for the 2012 presidential elections, suggesting that the 
prime minister had influenced the ICC prosecutor’s decision to target 
Ruto and Kenyatta.70  Though Odinga has firmly dismissed such 
allegations,71 it seems true that the ICC process comes convenient for 
the Prime Minister, who has never agreed on much with Ruto and 
started to see Ruto and Kenyatta threaten his path to the State House 
in 2012.72  Moreover, Odinga’s media appearances arguably indicate 
that he is using the ICC process to promote his own presidential 
aspirations.  For example, a few hours before the suspects took off to 
The Hague in connection with the April 2011 hearings, the Prime 
Minister went on national television to express his sympathy with the 
victims of the post-election violence.73 
In sum, ICC intervention has escalated the divides in political 
leadership.  Yet, rather than viewing the ICC process as the cause of 
tensions in Kenyan politics, it is more correct to view it as something 
which has added fuel to existing tensions and is being used as a tool to 
fight competitors for the 2012 presidential elections.  
                                                 
70. See id. 
71. See, e.g., Anthony Kariuki, Raila Insists on ICC Trial for Ocampo Six, 
DAILY NATION (Mar. 26, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Raila+ 
insists+on+ICC+trial+for+Ocampo+Six+/-/1064/1133462/-/yduvkoz/-/index.html. 
72. See, e.g., Raila, Ruto Clash Not Surprising at All, NAIROBI CHRONICLE 
(Aug. 17, 2009), http://nairobichronicle.wordpress.com/2009/08/17/%EF%BB% 
BFraila-ruto-clash-not-surprising-at-all/ (discussing a clash between Ruto and 
Odinga in 2009, which it is argued, follows a pattern that results from the two 
politicians’ opposed views on major issues).  
73. See Kenyatta-Odinga Rivalry Replayed, DAILY NATION (Apr. 9, 2011), 
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Kenyatta+Odinga+rivalry+replayed+/-
/1064/1141866/-/irxpwsz/-/index.html.  
Hansen_FINAL2.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/30/2012  10:24 AM 
20      CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 42 
B.  New Coalitions and Various Scenarios for the 2012 Elections 
i.  New Coalitions 
Following Ocampo’s naming of the ICC suspects, Ruto and 
Kenyatta formed an alliance, which also includes Vice President 
Musyoka and a number of other prominent politicians.74  The 
formation of such a coalition, which has the stated purpose of 
obtaining power in the 2012 elections,75 might seem ironic given that 
Ruto and Kenyatta are alleged to have incited violent attacks on each 
other’s supporters in connection to the 2008 elections.76  An obvious 
interpretation, therefore, is that the coalition is a “marriage of 
convenience” formed by the two suspects in order to influence 
government policies on the ICC issue, and to challenge Odinga’s way 
to State House next year by creating an opposition which may draw on 
the support of the members of some of the major tribes in Kenya (the 
Kikuyu, the Kalenjin, and the Kamba).77  However, whereas the ICC 
process has clearly influenced when this coalition was formed and 
seems to have strengthened the ties between Ruto and Kenyatta, it is 
not impossible that even in the absence of The Hague Court’s 
involvement in Kenya, Kenyatta and Ruto would have joined forces at 
some point prior to the 2012 elections, as forming such an alliance 
                                                 
74. Besides Vice President Musyoka, the alliance appears to include George 
Saitoti (Rift Valley), Abdikadir Mohamed (North Eastern), Najib Balala (Coast), 
and Eugene Wamalwa (Western).  See Murithi Mutiga, Hague Cases Set to Change 
the 2012 Election Game Plan, DAILY NATION (Apr. 9, 2011), 
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/A+race+against+time+/-/1064/1141852/-
/2ifwihz/-/index.html.  
75. See John Ngirachu, Uhuru and Ruto Strengthen Ties, DAILY NATION (Apr. 
1, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Uhuru+and+Ruto+strengthen 
+ties+/-/1064/1137354/-/xr4ekyz/-/index.html; Benson Amadala, Alliance Mulls 
Holding Presidential Nomination, DAILY NATION (June 18, 2011), 
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Alliance+mulls+holding+presidential+nomin
ation/-/1064/1184748/-/12nquuc/-/index.html. 
76. See Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Ruto, Kosgey 
and Sang, supra note 35; Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to 
Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali, supra note 35. 
77. See KNDR DRAFT REVIEW, supra note 27, at 47; Makau Mutua, The 
Group of Seven is a Tribal Alliance In All But Name, DAILY NATION (June 4, 2011), 
http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/The+Group+of+Seven+is+a+tribal+alliance+
in+all+but+name/-/440808/1174840/-/13qaf1h/-/index.html.  
Hansen_FINAL2.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/30/2012  10:24 AM 
2011] TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN KENYA? 21 
seemed the only way to offer a credible alternative to Odinga’s way to 
State House.78   
ii.  Various Scenarios for the 2012 Elections 
Though there have been a number of indications that the coalition 
enjoys strong support,79 only six percent of the voters indicated their 
support for the Kenyatta/Ruto combination in an April poll.80  
Furthermore, by June 2011, there were indications that the internal 
cohesion in the alliance might not be as strong as it had initially 
appeared.81  In the end, however, the success of the Ruto/Kenyatta 
alliance—and any other presidential candidate for the 2012 
elections—will to a large extent depend on the outcome of the ICC 
process.  
                                                 
78. See Julius Sigei et al., Ruto, Uhuru Allies Train Their Guns on Raila, 
DAILY NATION (Apr. 2, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Ruto+ 
Uhuru+allies+train+their+guns+on+Raila+/-/1064/1137712/-/xtcsasz/-/index.html 
(quoting Kenyatta as saying, “[t]hey were thinking that Mr Ruto [sic] and I will 
begin fighting each other over the evidence, but they are wrong.  We shall go to The 
Hague and come back as solid as before”); Raila, Ruto Clash Not Surprising at All, 
supra note 72.  
79. See John Ngirachu & Oliver Musembi, Uhuru, Ruto Hold Last Rally 
Ahead of Hague Visit, DAILY NATION (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/ 
News/politics/Uhuru+Ruto+hold+last+rally+ahead+of+Hague+visit//1064/1138654/
-/4you41/-/index.html (noting that fifty MPs attended the last Ruto/Kenyatta rally 
before they headed for The Hague); Jacob Ng’etich, Field Day for Ruto, Uhuru 
Loyalists¸ DAILY NATION (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/ 
Field+day+for+Ruto+Uhuru+loyalists+/-/1064/1141382/-/tnsqp5z/-/index.html 
(noting that more than forty MPs joined the suspects to The Hague to show support).  
80. See Oliver Mathenge, Raila-Mudavadi Tipped to Win in 2012, DAILY 
NATION (Apr. 30, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Raila+Mudavadi 
+tipped+to+win+in+2012+/-/1064/1153932/-/vsvwasz/-/index.html.  The most 
popular combination for the 2012 election involves Odinga and Mudavadi, who 
enjoy support by 20% of the voters, followed by a Kenyatta/Musyoka combination, 
which is supported by 8% of the voters.  Id.  On their own, the April poll shows that 
the most popular candidates for the 2012 presidential elections are: (1) Odinga 
(38%); (2) Kenyatta (18%); (3) Musyoka (13%); (4) Ruto (8%); and (5) Karua (6%).  
Id. 
81. See, e.g., Julius Sigei, What Ails Uhuru-Ruto Union?, DAILY NATION 
(June 4, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/What+ails+Uhuru+Ruto 
+union//1064/1175062/-/item/0/-/wdjwhb/-/index.html (noting that land issues seem 
to cause tensions in the alliance). 
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There are three potential outcomes of the ICC process: (1) 
Kenyatta and Ruto will not stand trial; (2) Kenyatta and Ruto are both 
charged; or (3) charges are confirmed against either Kenyatta or Ruto, 
but not the other.  Should Pre-Trial Chamber II decide that Kenyatta 
and Ruto will not stand trial, the two politicians would seem to stand 
with strong cards against the other main competitors for the 2012 
presidential elections, including Odinga.82  Not only will they be able 
to claim that their names have been cleared, but they will almost 
certainly attempt to discredit Odinga for having pushed for ICC 
trials.83  
On the contrary, should the Court decide to charge Ruto and 
Kenyatta, both will face an uphill battle in gaining the presidency.  
First, many commentators argue the new Constitution should be 
understood to prohibit anyone charged with a serious crime from 
running for president.84  Second, should Ruto and Kenyatta 
nonetheless run for president, Odinga and the other presidential 
candidates are likely to benefit, both because charges of crimes 
against humanity can hardly be seen as an asset in an election 
campaign and because the two suspects will be busy preparing their 
defenses for trials in The Hague.85  Furthermore, if Ruto (Kalenjin) 
and Kenyatta (Kikuyu) are out of the game, some speculate that the 
Kalenjin and Kikuyu ethnic groups might not follow past voting 
patterns, where members of each tribe have tended to vote almost 
unanimously for a candidate from their own or affiliated tribe, 
something which will likely benefit the other candidates, including 
Odinga.86 
                                                 
82. See Samwel Kumba, September Set to Shape Future of Kenyan Politics, 
DAILY NATION (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/September 
+set+to+shape+future+of+Kenyan+politics+/-/1064/1145550/-/yplfjr/-/index.html. 
83. See Mutiga, supra note 74.  
84. See, e.g., id. (citing Betty Murungi, an international law expert) (noting 
that the new constitution and the Public Officer Ethics Act would not allow the two 
to run for president if they are charged). 
85. See Kumba, supra note 82.  
86. See Kipchumba Some, Uhuru, Ruto Could Miss 2012 Polls, DAILY 
NATION (Mar. 12, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Uhuru+Ruto+ 
could+miss+2012+polls+/-/1064/1123978/-/item/1/-/14qvf8hz/-/index.html.  For 
further discussion on the ethnic dimensions of Kenyan politics, see Fred Jonyo, 
Ethnicity in Multi Party Politics, in ELECTORAL POLITICS IN KENYA 86-107 (Ludeki 
Cheya ed., 2002).  
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Should the court confirm charges against only one of the two 
individuals, the person who is not charged would seem to pose a 
serious challenge to Odinga and the other presidential candidates, as 
he is likely to draw support from those who had intended to support 
the person charged.87  
Yet, there are a number of uncertain factors, which might prove 
determinative for the 2012 elections.  For example, it is difficult to 
predict how Vice President Musyoka will respond to the various 
scenarios, and a leadership dispute between Ruto and Kenyatta 
certainly cannot be excluded.88  Further, Kenyan politics are 
unpredictable in that new alliances can be formed quickly, and new, 
lesser-known politicians, may be “boosted” for the presidential post.  
In March 2011, for example, Roads Minister, Franklin Bett, a Kalenjin 
who has generally been seen as aligned with Odinga, indicated that he 
will run for president.89  Some consider Bett’s move as an attempt to 
position himself as an alternative for the Kalenjins, should Ruto be 
charged.90 
C.  How the ICC Process Impacts Peace and Security 
Because tensions in the political leadership can spread to 
communities, the impact of the ICC process on Kenyan politics is 
closely related to the highly-contested question of how ICC 
intervention affects peace and security in the country.  Some—
including a number of government officials—argue that the pursuit of 
accountability in the run-up to the 2012 election might trigger new 
political violence.  For example, a Kenyan ambassador rhetorically 
asks: “[i]s a rush to undertake the pre-trial process in the political 
climate of a presidential campaign worth the risk of destabilising the 
country and a return to violence and loss of life in Kenya?”91  In 
contrast, many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and 
                                                 
87. See Mutiga, supra note 74. 
88. Makau Mutua, Why a Fallout Between Ruto and Uhuru is Inevitable, 
DAILY NATION (June 18, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Why+a+ 
fallout+between+Ruto+and+Uhuru+is+inevitable+/-/440808/1184970/-/11ojv6hz/-
/index.html. 
89. See, e.g., Some, supra note 86.  
90. Id. 
91. Kamau Letter, supra note 48. 
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academics involved with the issue argue that ICC trials will promote 
peace and security in the country, not least since they will counter a 
culture of impunity.92  Though somewhat tenuous, a number of 
linkages between the ICC process and security in the country can be 
identified. 
i.  Triggering or Limiting the Use of Hate Speech? 
 A first concern is that the political tensions described above have 
been accompanied by “[a] tone for divisive ethno-political 
mobilisation,” resembling what has surrounded other instances of 
political violence in the country.93  There are plenty of examples of 
such rhetoric.  For example, Public Works Assistant Minister Mwangi 
Kiunjuri, a vocal supporter of Kenyatta, has stated:  
If we don’t talk about Raila [Odinga] now, we shall be caught 
unawares as a community . . . .  Raila is not a good person.  He is 
like the animal that eats the chicken and its eggs . . . .  A hyena is 
hunted by a man and his in-law and a house that is divided is 
destroyed by one stone . . . .  A hyena hunts by following you in the 
hope that your swinging hand will fall off.  But we must get rid of 
this hyena now . . . .  Let me tell you, uncircumcised boys [making 
reference to the Luo ethnic group to which Odinga belongs] are not 
invited to dowry negotiations because, as you know, boys will 
always take time to sing their play songs.  An uncircumcised boy’s 
goings are only ended when he faces the knife.94   
PNU Chief Whip Johnstone Muthama made statements of similar 
gravity.95  Kenyatta and Ruto have also engaged in hard attacks on 
                                                 
92. See, e.g., Letter from Non-Governmental Organizations in Kenya to the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs of African ICC States Parties on the UN Security 
Council (Mar. 1, 2011) [hereinafter NGO Letter to African ICC States],  available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/ 03/02/gabonnigeriasouth-africa-reconsider-
support-deferral-icc-kenya-investigation. 
93. See KNDR DRAFT REVIEW, supra note 27, at vi. 
94. John Ngirachu, Uhuru and Ruto Warned Over Hate Speech at Rallies  ¸
DAILY NATION (Apr. 2, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-
/1064/1137688/-/item/1/-/1e2x0t/-/index.html. 
95. Id. 
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Odinga, though generally abstaining from the same level of ethnically-
divisive propaganda.96  
The use of statements like those cited here poses a serious risk for 
the recurrence of political violence.  Political commentator Onesmus 
Murkommen explains: “[i]n Kenya certain leaders embody the ideals 
of their respective communities and that is why they are kingpins 
where they come from.  Therefore, an attack on these individuals is 
construed to be an attack on the larger community.”97  Some argue 
that tensions in the political elite—and the potential for the elites to 
mobilize masses through “hate speech”—present the biggest challenge 
for peace and security in the country.98 
While the political climate has changed dramatically due to ICC 
involvement, and ICC involvement seems to have triggered the use of 
“hate speech,” the ICC may at the same time remedy some of these 
problems.  First, though some politicians attempt to make the ICC 
process look like an attack on whole communities, the hearings may 
ultimately contribute to an understanding that it was individuals who 
organized the violence to maintain or obtain power.  It is interesting in 
this regard that a recent survey reveals that more than fifty percent of 
Kenyans expect community members to support ICC trials even if 
they target leaders of their own ethnic group, while only four percent 
predict such targeting could lead to a violent response.99  
Second, the Court has taken certain steps to limit the use of 
divisive ethno-political rhetoric.  During the April hearings, the 
presiding judge of Pre-Trial Chamber II warned the suspects in 
                                                 
96. E.g., id. (quoting Kenyatta as calling Odinga a “kimundu” (a nuisance 
bully) and stating, “[n]ow that Raila keeps describing some of us as drunkards, do 
we go drinking with his wife?  And now that he keeps telling us to go to The Hague, 
is that Hague his mother’s place?  Is The Hague your mother’s place for you to keep 
singing about it?”). 
97. Kipchumba Some, Will this be Raila’s Waterloo?, DAILY NATION (Apr. 
16, 2011). 
98.  See KNDR DRAFT REVIEW, supra note 27, at v (“Sustaining the peace and 
calm that was secured [in 2008] depends on only one major factor: how political 
leaders reconcile their differences as the country moves towards the next General 
Election, and specifically how they organise their politics for presidential contests.  
National level political dynamics will influence local level issues; conflicts will 
trickle to the local level and disrupt inter-ethnic relations.  There is thus need to 
manage national level political divisions to prevent a recurrence of violence.”) 
99. Id. at 17. 
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general tones that any use of “dangerous speeches” could lead the 
Chamber to issue arrest warrants on the suspects.100  The warnings 
issued seem to have had some impact on the nature of statements 
subsequently made.  For example, there was a notable change in the 
language used during the “home-coming” rally, with Ruto stating, 
“[w]e are prepared to carry this cross but our consolation is that never 
again shall a Kenyan lose his life or property because of political 
competition.”101 
ii.  Promoting or Hampering Kenya’s Reform Agenda? 
Another issue where the ICC process has a complex relationship 
to peace and security concerns its impact on the reform agenda in 
Kenya, which is recognized by many as crucial for preventing 
political violence in the country.102  On the one hand, it seems as if the 
recent, overwhelming focus on the ICC process has to some extent led 
to neglect of the reform agenda.  As the Panel of Eminent African 
Personalities explains, “the personalisation and politicisation of the 
ICC process had obscured dialogue on reforms that would prevent 
future violence and the need to find justice for the victims, including 
IDPs.”103  
On the other hand, there are also indications that ICC involvement 
has caused politicians to pay increased attention to certain aspects of 
the reform agenda.  For example, Kenyan politicians have understood 
that their prospects of succeeding with the admissibility challenge are 
closely related to the reform agenda.  This is well illustrated by a 
statement made by Central Kenya MPs Association’s Chairman, 
Ephraim Maina:  
                                                 
100. See International Criminal Court, Ruto, Kosgey & Sang Case: Initial 
Appearance, 7 April 2011, YOUTUBE (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/ 
IntlCriminalCourt#p/search/1/CQ09M8LeVJA. 
101. See Peter Leftie, Uhuru and Ruto Vow to Preach Peace, DAILY NATION 
(Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Uhuru+and+Ruto+vow+to 
+preach+peace+/-/1064/1142960/-/9tmj05z/-/index.html. 
102. See, e.g., Thomas Obel Hansen, Will the New Constitution Lead to a 
More Peaceful Kenya?, AFR. ARGUMENTS ONLINE (Aug. 4, 2010),  
http://africanarguments.org/2010/08/will-the-new-constitution-lead-to-a-more-
peaceful-kenya/.  
103. ICC Politics Hindrance to Reform, Says Annan, DAILY NATION (May 25, 
2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/1169078/-/7s68nl/-/index.html.  
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We must now concentrate on enacting laws that will lead to 
creation of a tenable judicial mechanism and ensure it is in place by 
September when the Six return to The Hague.  With this, the 
country will be able to argue for a deferral and transfer of the case 
home.104 
Notable progress, seemingly related to this perceived linkage, includes 
the recent approval of a new Chief Justice who is generally believed to 
be a “pro-reformer.”105  Furthermore, after significant controversy, 
Parliament has passed some crucial bills throughout 2011 to reform 
the judiciary—actions which seem to have been promoted by a 
perceived relationship between judicial reforms and the prospects of 
succeeding with the admissibility challenge.106   
iii.  Will the ICC Process Deter Political Leaders from Utilizing 
Violence as a Political Tool? 
Finally, the ICC process might deter political leaders in the 
country from using violence as a tool to maintain or obtain power.  
Some argue that pursuing accountability runs counter to peace and 
security because by targeting presidential candidates, the ICC process 
will push powerful individuals into a corner where, out of desperation, 
they will be more disposed to incite and organize violence.107  Though 
such a scenario certainly cannot be excluded, it nonetheless seems 
more likely that the accountability process will contribute to peace and 
security in the country, at least in the long run.  The ICC process 
                                                 
104. Njeri Rugene, MPs: ICC’s Handling of Suspects Okay, DAILY NATION 
(Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/1140986/-/7qr43d/-
/index.html. 
105. See Mutunga, Baraza and Tobiko Get House Nod, DAILY NATION (June 
15, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Mutunga+Baraza+and+ 
Tobiko+get+House+nod++/-/1064/1181740/-/15qvdh5/-/index.html.  
106. For an overview of the bills passed, see Alphonce Shiundu, MPs Work 
Overtime to Pass Crucial Bills, DAILY NATION (June 1, 2011), 
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/1172996/-/7sn4fj/-/index.html. 
107. See, e.g., Kamau Letter, supra note 48 (“Some of the individuals 
mentioned by the ICC prosecutor are among the front runner presidential candidates 
and the civil servants mentioned are in office and charged with responsibilities for 
peace and security.  Needless to say, therefore, the pending ICC indictments pose a 
real and present danger to the exercise of government and the management of peace 
and security in the country.”). 
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presents an important step forward in ending Kenya’s legacy of 
impunity, which has been a prerequisite for political violence.  The 
potential trial of six powerful Kenyans is likely to make political 
leaders think twice before ordering violent attacks on their opponents 
in the future.108  While the deterrent effect of the ICC as such is 
disputed,109 in the specific case of Kenya, where members of the 
political elites have for decades incited large-scale violence with 
impunity, there seems thus to be some merit in claiming that the 
Court’s actions might deter other political leaders from using violence 
as a political tool in the future.110  Interestingly, a recently published 
study reveals that ordinary Kenyans view prosecuting the people 
responsible for political violence as the single-most important way of 
preventing new violence.111 
The court hearings might also indirectly contribute to ending a 
practice of using violence for political purposes, as they seem to limit 
                                                 
108. See, e.g., NGO Letter to African ICC States, supra note 92.  
109. For a discussion of the role international tribunals can play for deterring 
large-scale violence, see MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 169-73 (2007) (arguing that international courts face a number 
of serious obstacles deterring potential war criminals and perpetrators of other 
international crimes).  See also Miriam Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary 
Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. 
J. 39, 63-71 (2002) (expressing doubts as to the effectiveness of criminal justice as a 
deterrent); Margaret M. DeGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at 
the International Criminal Court, MICH. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1780446 (assuming that deterrence “provides a partial 
justification for the ICC’s work,” but emphasizing that deterrence theory also fails to 
provide an “adequate basis for making selection decisions at the Court”); David 
Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23 
FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 473 (1999) (arguing that international courts have a limited 
deterrent effect); Jonathan I. Charney, Editorial Comment: Progress in International 
Criminal Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 452, 462 (1999) (arguing that consistent 
prosecution of state leaders may have some deterrent effect). 
110. CIPEV, supra note 14, at 22 (“Over time, this deliberate use of violence 
by politicians to obtain power since the early 1990s, plus the decision not to punish 
perpetrators has led to a culture of impunity and a constant escalation of violence.”).   
See also Impact of the Rome Statute, supra note 9; Asaala, supra note 6, at 390-95. 
111.  KNDR DRAFT REVIEW, supra note 27, at 25 (finding that the five most 
important measures for preventing new violence are seen by Kenyans as: (1) 
“[p]rosecute those responsible for violence” (21%);  (2) “promote peace and 
reconciliation” (18%); (3) “fight tribalism (17%); (4) “free and fair elections (12 %); 
and (5) “politicians stop incitement” (8 %)). 
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the perception that Kenya’s political elite are untouchable.  For 
example, during the April hearings in The Hague, Presiding Judge 
Ekaterina Trendafilova ordered Ruto to sit down and be quiet when he 
claimed the charges brought against him “can only be possible in a 
movie.”112  This clear signal sent by the judge that the Court will not 
allow any manipulation of the hearings seemed to surprise Ruto, a 
politician who is generally viewed by Kenyans as beyond the reach of 
the law.113  Importantly, the incident received significant attention in 
Kenyan media, with one commentator sarcastically noting that “[i]t 
took the eloquence of Eldoret North MP William Ruto to make the 
point that everybody has been getting unnecessarily excited over a 
movie—a work of art, the fictive imaginings of a fertile mind.”114  
D.  Toward Transition with the ICC? 
The ICC process has had—and will in all probability continue to 
have in the near future—a significant impact on politics and security 
in Kenya.  Yet, while ICC intervention has clearly impacted Kenyan 
politics in fundamental ways, the developments taking place should 
often be seen as triggered, rather than caused by the ICC.  As noted 
by Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Justice and Legal 
Affairs, Mr. Ababu Namwamba, “[the ICC dispute] is a tiny piece of 
the iceberg.  The real prize is succession and control over the shaping 
of the Second Republic.”115  While it remains uncertain who will 
                                                 
112. See International Criminal Court, Ruto, Kosgey & Sang Case: Initial 
Appearance, 7 April 2011, supra note 100. 
113. In April 2011, for example, Ruto was acquitted in a grant corruption case 
due to the absence of witnesses who could testify against him.  The witnesses had 
either died or were unwilling to testify, often because they had subsequently been 
employed by Ruto.  See Fraud Case: Ruto Gave Job to Key Potential Witnesses, 
DAILY NATION (Apr. 16, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Fraud+case 
+Ruto+gave+job+to+key+potential+witness+/-/1064/1145926/-/t8qmt6z/-
/index.html. 
114. See Kwamchetsi Makokha, Op-Ed., Yes, Kenya’s Post-Election Violence 
Was Just a Harmless Horror Movie, DAILY NATION (Apr. 8, 2011), 
http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Yes+post+poll+chaos+was+just+movie+/-
/440808/1141222/-/2uheoh/-/index.html.  
115. Mugumo Munene, Power Politics Behind Kibaki-Raila Standoff, DAILY 
NATION (Feb. 19, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Power+politics 
+behind+Kibaki+Raila+standoff+/-/1064/1111064/-/119sqsmz/-/index.html.   
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eventually benefit politically from the accountability process, it also 
remains uncertain whether the ICC process will promote profound 
political transition.  However, profiling the main candidates may cast 
some light on the prospects for fundamental political change. 
Kenyatta and Ruto, who were associated with the Moi regime (the 
authoritarian leader that ruled Kenya from 1978-2002), are generally 
seen as conservative powers who work on the premises of tribal 
politics and are unlikely to promote fundamental reforms of the 
system of governance.116 
Musyoka, an experienced politician with roots in Moi’s 
dictatorship, is also seen by most as a pragmatic politician who is 
opposed to fundamental changes.117   
Odinga, who was detained as a political prisoner during Moi’s 
dictatorship, is generally understood to be relatively supportive of the 
reform agenda.  But Odinga is also seen as pragmatic, and the extent 
to which he will be able to reform the system of governance is likely 
to depend on a number of other factors, including who he allies with 
for the 2012 elections.118   
Karua, a dedicated women’s rights activist, is generally accepted 
to be an outspoken pro-reformer.  While she is arguably the only 
major presidential candidate who shows some reluctance toward 
working on the premises of tribal politics, she might be forced to enter 
an alliance which would make it harder, but not impossible, to 
promote profound transition.119  Put simply, should the ICC choose to 
                                                 
116. See Raila, Ruto Clash Not Surprising at All, supra note 72; Willy 
Mutunga, The Unfolding Political Alliances and their Implications for Kenya’s 
Transition, in BUILDING AN OPEN SOCIETY: THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION IN 
KENYA, supra note 20, at 60; David Kariuki, Guest Column: Casting Uhuru 
Kenyatta’s Profile into Perspective, KENYA STOCKHOLM BLOG (June 2, 2011), 
http://kenyastockholm.com/2011/06/02/guest-column-casting-uhuru-kenyattas-
profile-into-perspective/. 
117. See Joe Khamisi, How Kalonzo and Uhuru Plotted to Stop Raila, DAILY 
NATION (Apr. 23, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/How+Kalonzo 
+and+Uhuru+plotted+to+stop+Raila+/-/1064/1149826/-/ie2eu3z/-/index.html; 
Mutunga, supra note 116.  
118. See Raila, Ruto Clash Not Surprising at All, supra note 72; Mutunga, 
supra note 116; Noel Mwakugu, Odinga: Kenya’s King-Maker, BBC NEWS (Apr. 
17, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7068055.stm. 
119. See, e.g., Makau Mutua, Op-Ed., Five Reasons Martha Karua Could Win 
the Presidency, DAILY NATION (May 7, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/ 
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charge Ruto and Kenyatta, presidential candidates who are more 
disposed to transforming the system of governance would likely 
benefit.   
Beyond the impact on succession politics, the ICC process may 
also promote transition in Kenya in other ways.  In particular, the 
accountability process offers hope that political leaders will be more 
reluctant to use violence as a political tool in the future, thus 
potentially leading the way to peaceful transformation.  Yet, other 
measures such as implementing the new constitution and combating 
so-called political tribalism are also needed to bring about a profound 
transition.120  While ICC involvement in the short-term might prove 
an obstacle for ensuring that sufficient attention is paid to such 
measures, the reform process ultimately has little value if not followed 
by a “culture of accountability.”  Overall, the ICC process should thus 
be viewed as something positive for promoting peaceful transition in 
Kenya.  
CONCLUSION 
This article has examined the complicated process of pursuing 
accountability for the 2008 post-election violence in Kenya, and how 
the accountability process impacts domestic politics and security.  
While significant obstacles to a meaningful transition lie ahead, the 
absence of a regime change should not be viewed as a factor that per se 
renders it impossible to commence an accountability process that might 
ultimately promote political and peaceful transition.  The Kenyan case 
sets itself apart from most other cases of transitional justice in that 
there has been a partial, though extremely shifting, commitment to 
pursuing accountability in a scenario where those who allegedly 
sponsored large-scale violence still form part of the country’s 
leadership.  Although this commitment has not materialized into the 
establishment of a local accountability process—and crucial parts of 
the leadership strongly oppose ICC involvement in the country—the 
accountability process is nonetheless ongoing, and there are signs that 
                                                 
Opinion/Five+reasons+Martha+Karua+could+win+the+presidency+/440808/11580
38/-/gx3dl1/-/index.html.  
120. Thomas Obel Hansen, The Kenya Transitional Justice Brief, vol. 1, no. 2, 
August 2011, INT’L CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., (Sept. 2011), 
http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-KEN-Transitional-Justice-Brief-2-2011.pdf. 
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it is more likely to promote progressive transformation than not.  It 
therefore also makes some sense to speak of “transitional justice” in 
Kenya—if understood as a potential driver of transition, rather than 
something that is preconditioned on an already existing transition. 
AFTERWORD 
On January 23, 2012—after this article had been completed and 
prepared for publication—Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC made the 
much-awaited decision on the charges brought by the Prosecutor with 
regard to Kenya’s post-election violence.  The majority of judges 
found substantial grounds to believe that four of the six suspects 
committed the crimes alleged by the Prosecutor.121  In the PNU case, 
the Chamber concluded that “there is sufficient evidence to establish 
substantial grounds to believe that Mr. Muthaura and Mr. Kenyatta are 
individually criminally responsible as indirect co-perpetrators” for 
murder, deportation or forcible transfer of population, rape, 
persecution, and other inhumane acts, all constituting crimes against 
humanity under the Rome Statute.122  The evidence presented, the 
Chamber noted, supports the Prosecutor’s allegations of close links 
between Kenyatta and Muthaura and the Mungiki gang.123  In the 
ODM case, the Chamber found sufficient evidence to establish 
substantial grounds to believe that Ruto is criminally responsible as an 
indirect co-perpetrator and Sang for contributing to the crimes of 
murder, deportation or forcible transfer of population, and 
persecution, amounting to crimes against humanity.124  Assessing the 
                                                 
121. Judge Hans-Peter Kaul dissented for the same reason that he dissented to 
the prior decisions, namely on the ground that the policy requirement in crimes 
against humanity is seen not to be satisfied. 
122. Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the Case of the Prosecutor v. 
Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, 
Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Public Redacted Version, Decision on the Confirmation 
of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 428 (Jan. 23, 
2012),   http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1314543.pdf [hereinafter Decision on 
the Confirmation of Charges – Muthaura, Kenyatta & Ali]. 
123. See id. ¶¶ 301-308.   
124. Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the Case of the Prosecutor v. 
William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Case No. 
ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 299 (Jan. 23, 2012),   http://www.icc-
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evidence presented, the Chamber found reasons to believe that Ruto 
played a crucial role organizing the attacks on PNU supporters, 
including adopting a “stipendiary scheme and a rewarding mechanism 
to motivate the perpetrators to kill and displace the largest number of 
persons belonging to the targeted communities as well as to destroy 
their properties.”125  The Chamber dismissed the defense team’s claim 
that any alleged misconduct of the Prosecutor has a bearing on the 
confirmation of charges.126 
Unless the Appeals Chamber reverses the decisions, Kenyatta, 
Muthaura, Ruto, and Sang will thus stand trial in the near future, while 
Kosgey and Ali are no longer suspected by the Court.  The suspects 
committed for trial all immediately indicated their intent to appeal the 
Chamber’s ruling, with Ruto and Kenyatta further emphasizing that 
their run for the presidency remains unaffected by the prospects of 
international trials.127  While the Prosecutor has publically stated that 
he will not appeal the Court’s decision concerning Kosgey and Ali, at 
the same time he noted that he will “keep investigating Kosgey and 
the activities of the police as well as crimes allegedly committed in 
Kibera and Kisumu.”128  
It remains unclear at present exactly how the government will 
react to the Court’s ruling.  However, in a speech delivered on the day 
of the ruling, President Kibaki implied that the government views its 
own (partly reformed) judiciary as capable of dealing with the post-
election violence cases.129  Subsequently, the Attorney-General stated 
he will consult the newly appointed Chief Justice, noting that “[w]e in 
                                                 
cpi.int/iccdocs/ doc/doc1314535.pdf [hereinafter Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges – Ruto, Kosgey & Sang]. 
125. Id. ¶ 303. 
126. See Decision on the Confirmation of Charges – Muthaura, Kenyatta & 
Ali, supra note 122, ¶¶ 63-65; Decision on the Confirmation of Charges – Ruto, 
Kosgey & Sang, supra note 124, ¶¶ 49-53. 
127. See Xinhua, Kenyan Suspects to Appeal Against ICC Ruling, DAILY 
NATION (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Kenyan 
+suspects+to+appeal+ against+ICC+ruling/-/1064/1312660/-/mth9mlz/-/index.html.  
128. Statement by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court on Kenya 
Ruling (Jan. 24, 2012),  http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/54E6388D-4DD0-4E85-
8FA9-90DA95A2AFB3.htm. 
129. See Kibaki Orders Githu to Set Up Legal Team on Ruling, DAILY NATION 
(Jan. 23, 2012),  http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Kibaki+orders+Githu+to 
+set+up+legal+team+on+ruling+/-/1064/1312780/-/13okgghz/-/index.html. 
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government are confident that under the stewardship of Chief Justice 
Willy Mutunga, the Judiciary is robust and capable of undertaking this 
challenge.”130  The Attorney-General further stated that that the two 
members of the government—Finance Minister Kenyatta and Head of 
Public Service Muthaura—will remain in office.131  As the Court has 
already dismissed Kenya’s admissibility challenge, this could be seen 
as a policy statement indicating potential non-cooperation with the 
ICC.  It is thus unclear whether the government ultimately intends to 
respect the Court’s claim of jurisdiction, including potentially handing 
over the suspects to the ICC should they fail to appear voluntarily.  
Understanding the motives for such opposition, it is necessary to take 
into account that the trial of Muthaura and Kenyatta may implicate the 
President directly in the violence.  Notably, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
finding that there are substantial grounds to believe that several 
meetings were held at Nairobi State House between “Mr. Muthaura, 
Mr. Kenyatta, Mungiki representatives, President Mwai Kibaki, and 
others” raises the question of how the President could attend such 
meetings without having endorsed, or at least been familiar with, the 
plans of attacking ODM supporters.132  
Keeping in mind that Odinga and other prominent ODM party 
members will likely push hard for the commencement of the ICC 
trials, tensions between the coalition partners may escalate in the 
coming months, possibly leading to the complete breakdown of the 
coalition government.  In this event, the election date could be pushed 
forward from the March 2013 date recently ruled the deadline by a 
Kenyan court.133  In sum, the political landscape in Kenya will 
continue to be dramatically affected by the ICC cases, likely 
increasing already existing tensions.  While there is a danger that 
some politicians may attempt to mobilize masses in an effort to avoid 
ICC prosecutions and gain power, it is also worth noting that there 
                                                 
130. John Ngirachu, Uhuru, Muthaura Can Remain in Office, AG, DAILY 
NATION (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Uhuru+ 
Muthaura+can+remain+in+office+AG+/-/1064/1313300/-/11gcupgz/-/index.html.  
131. Id.   
132. See, e.g., Decision on the Confirmation of Charges – Muthaura, Kenyatta 
& Ali, supra note 122, ¶¶ 310-332 (regarding meeting on Nov. 26, 2007). 
133. Court: Kenya Set for 2013 Poll Unless Coalition Dissolved, DAILY 
NATION (Jan. 13, 2012),  http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Kenya+set+for+ 
2013+poll +unless+coalition+dissolved/-/1064/1304976/-/12wigpq/-/index.html. 
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were no immediate violent responses to the ICC ruling and that most 
ordinary Kenyans continue to support the Court’s intervention.134  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
134. See Tom Maliti, Polls: Support for ICC Remains High, But Fear of 
Violence Has Increased, KENYA MONITOR (Jan. 19, 2012), 
http://www.icckenya.org/2012/01/polls-support-for-icc-remains-high-but-fear-of-
violence-has-increased/. 
